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politicartoons2014-07-06 12:48 am
yes-justice.livejournal.com) wrote in politicartoons2014-07-06 12:48 amyes-justice.livejournal.com) wrote in politicartoons2014-07-06 12:48 am
no subject
As an atheist, I go as far as to say: "No worthy evidence has ever been produced. Because I have no evidence in favor of, I maintain that there is no such thing as God. I could be wrong--but I believe there is no God."
The only epistemologically truly knowable thing is self-referential knowledge. Otherwise it's always possible we are in a matrix.
no subject
Anyway, key to me is that you're willing to state it's a belief, not knowledge.
The only epistemologically truly knowable thing is self-referential knowledge.
No. I believe that has been the great win of science; the replicable experiment. Even self referential knowledge is unknowable if we're brains in vats. However, if we accept at a base, that this thing around us that we perceive is actually there, even if we are imperfect perceivers, then we can make tools that we can objectively calibrate and then measure things, over and over again, and if the answer comes up the same each time, we can be fairly confident that we can call this knowledge. The "that", not necessarily the "how"; I believe in gravity, because it can be measured. I can make predictions about how it will behave and they will come true. What I can't do is tell you "how" that works. Gravity, or at least the effects of, is objectively knowable. I can't do any of that for a deity and if I can't disprove it, if I can't predict how it will react, then in my epistemological system (and I acknowledge that we as humans have no agreement on that) it is not knowable.
no subject
I usually prefer to say it as "the what and the how, but not necessarily the why".
no subject
no subject
Only if your philosophical premises are accepted as true.
Which is why I accept no philosophical premises as true. I only accept reproducible experiments and hard objective evidence as true - and everything else as a subjective dream.
no subject
You just described a philosophical premise you accept as true.
no subject
I repeat: I only accept reproducible experiments and hard objective evidence as true. That is not a philosophical premise.
And to further specify, "true" = "verifiable fact" in my lexicon. I don't believe in "truth".
Everything that cannot be reproduced in experiments or classified with hard objective evidence is either opinion, musings, dreams, or something else non-objective - and the opposite of objective is subjective.
Now, if you somehow measure Kant's Transcendental Arguments in a laboratory and perform experiments on it to show me how it's measured in Kantians or whatever scientific measurement would be used for that, I'll pay attention to it.
no subject
trueverifiable fact"You aren't saying anything much of interest there. Verifiable facts = objective evidence and reproducible experiments
Well, OK. You're assuming some things in there, and the assumption might be good to look at, but nothing much being said that's useful.
And, you have underlying assumptions like: "experiments performed by different people or in different places or times, or altitudes, can still be said to be a reproduction of the other experiment, despite all of the differences"
End with a joke:
A layman, a student and a philosopher are in a boat, back before we knew there were black swans, and low and behold, they see a black swan, a good bit off, swimming along parallel with their boat.
The layman says: "ah, now we know there are black swans"
The student says: "ah, now we know there is *a* black swan"
The philosopher says: "ah, now we know there is one-half of one swan is black"
no subject
I am sorry you do not find my dismissal of subjective things as irrelevant and my embrace of the real, objective world to be interesting.
Actually, I'm not sorry, but it's the polite thing to say.
And, you have underlying assumptions like: "experiments performed by different people or in different places or times, or altitudes, can still be said to be a reproduction of the other experiment, despite all of the differences"
If it is conducted in accordance with the rigors of the scientific method, then yes, it qualifies as a reproduction of the evidence. The differences only become relevant if it is proven that those differences would have an effect on the outcome - that's the whole point about introducing new variables. By default, a reproduced experiment will not include new variables.
But as a philosopher with a philosophy degree, this should have been covered in your science classes, and so you should already know this.
A layman, a student and a philosopher are in a boat, back before we knew there were black swans, and low and behold, they see a black swan, a good bit off, swimming along parallel with their boat.
The layman says: "ah, now we know there are black swans"
The student says: "ah, now we know there is *a* black swan"
The philosopher says: "ah, now we know there is one-half of one swan is black"
1) And then the scientist on the shore actually photographs, measures, captures, and dissects the black swan, creating scientific evidence of the phenomena and how it came to exist.
2) The response of the philosopher, in my experience, would actually be "In looking at the black swan, one is faced with a choice: either accept deconstructivist destructuralism or conclude that reality may be used to marginalize the proletariat. The swan is contextualised into a Lacanist obscurity that includes consciousness as a whole. However, Lacan promotes the use of patriarchial libertarianism on a Kantian scale to modify and analyze class. Thus, the black swan is contextualised again into a Batailleist `powerful communication’ that includes reality as a paradox, symbolizing a mythopoetical reality."